Emily L. Gardner v. Newhouse Realty Company : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2004
Emily L. Gardner v. Newhouse Realty Company :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Henry D. Moyle; J. M. Christensen; Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent.
Unknown.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Gardner v. Newhouse Realty Company, No. 4651.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2488
1 
J MEN! 
M - «; ' 
JRIEE 
KET NO, JiltSLV 
SUPREME COUR' 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EMILY L. GARDNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
NEWHOUSE REALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent., 
No. 4G.r 
BRTEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPOND KNr; 
HENRY D MOYLlfl 
J. M. CHRISTENS] 
Attorneys for Defendant and Resp-
THE SCHOENFEL.D PRESS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
EMILY L. GARDNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
NEWHOUSE REALTY COMPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 4651 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
This is an action by one Emily Gardner to recover 
damages for injuries claimed to have been sustained 
on the 18th day of November, 1925, at the Newhouse 
Hotel in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
It is alleged that while the plaintiff was in the act 
of entering an elevator at the Newhouse Hotel and be-
fore she had an opportunity to get into a safe position 
therein, the defendant carelessly and negligently started 
the elevator suddenly upward, by reason whereof, as the 
said elevator ascended, plaintiff was struck violently up-
on the shoulder, shoulder blade and back by the top of 
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the entrance of said elevator and projections above, 
whereby she was knocked to the floor and sustained the 
injuries of which she complains. 
The amended answer consists of a general denial 
of the allegations of the complaint and an affirmative 
defense to the effect that plaintiff is barred from re-
covery by reason of her own contributory negligence. 
The acts of contributory negligence alleged were that 
she failed to face the front of said elevator and that 
she was moving about and conversing with other pas-
sengers ail of which directly contributed to the injury, 
if any, which she sustained. 
To this affirmative matter in the answer no reply 
was filed. By elementary rules of pleading the affirma-
tive defense in the answer must therefore be taken to 
be true. 
The cause came on for trial during September term, 
1926, before Judge Morris L. Ritchie with a jury. 
After taking all the evidence, an examination of the 
premises on which the injury is alleged to have occurred 
was made by the court and counsel. 
Thereupon counsel for the defendant requested the 
court to direct a verdict for the defendant upon two 
grounds: First, that there was no evidence of negligence 
as alleged in the complaint; Second, that the evidence 
affirmatively established that the plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence directly contributing to the injuries, if any, 
sustained by her. 
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The Court in ruling upon and granting this motion 
said: (Trans. 215.) 
" There is only one act of negligence alleged 
and it reads as follows, omitting preliminary 
leading up to it: 
' And then and there while the plaintiff 
was in the act of entering said elevator, and 
before she had an opportunity to get to a 
safe position therein, the defendant careless-
ly and negligently started said elevator sud-
denly upward, by reason whereof as the said 
elevator ascended, plaintiff was struck vio-
lently upon the shoulder, shoulder blade and 
back by the top of the entrance of said ele-
vator and projections above the same, where-
by the plaintiff was knocked to the floor of 
said elevator and sustained injuries. As I 
remarked a moment ago during the argu-
ment, I don't see that it is material at all 
just what particular part struck her. It is 
evident that she was struck by something, 
and now the allegation is that while the plain-
tiff was in the act of entering said elevator, 
and before she had an opportunity to get to 
a safe position therein this thing happened. 
The testimony of both the operator, the 
young lady, and the engineer, is that the ele-
vator could not be started until the door was 
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closed and locked. That is a physical fact 
which is not disputed, so I take it that it must 
be taken as true, she evidently was inside the 
elevator. I can see how it psychologically 
appeared to her; she was in the act of enter-
ing, in fact she had just completed the act of 
entering, but had not turned around. Whether 
she intended to or not nobody knows; wheth-
er she ought to or not, that is, whether any 
person, as intimated by some of the wit-
nesses, they ought to turn around as soon 
as they get in and face the front, we are 
not called upon to pass judgment. 
The operator, as I understand her testi-
mony, in closing the door, would have to 
reach at least partially behind the person 
in the position she (Mrs. Gardner, the plain-
tiff) was in, couldn't get her arm across to 
close the door. Let's assume the operator 
stands here; this is the entrance, the door is 
over there, she has to reach over and pull 
the door over in some way, and in order to 
do that her arm would necessarily go back 
of the plaintiff. Now she did that, she closed 
the door and locked it and then started the 
elevator. That is her testimony and refer-
ring again to her own testimony and that of 
the engineer, she couldn't start the elevator 
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until she did all these things. That must be 
taken to be true.' " 
After some questions and suggestions by Judge Mc-
Kinney, representing the plaintiff, the court continued. 
" I think the rod is nearer the center of the 
door. Let's state what the facts are; last night 
after court, counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. Mc-
Kinney, and counsel for the defendant, Mr. Chris-
tensen, and the court, went over to the Newhouse 
Hotel, and we found that the particular elevator, 
the east elevator, was somewhat out of repair and 
not in use, and we were advised the next one to 
it was an elevator of exactly the same pattern, so 
we stepped in there and it was operated up to the 
Mezzanine floor and back for our benefit. Now 
if there is any difference in our recollection as to 
that, counsel will recall that we made no comment, 
we had agreed to do that, we simply stood there 
and looked, such a view as that is really part of 
the evidence. But so that I can obviate the dif-
ficulty, let's assume that the operator had to put 
her hand in some way back of the person, that 
statement is withdrawn and eliminated. At any 
rate, where the door was closed, whether it was 
done mechanically by the operation of the usual 
apparatus or not, the plaintiff must have been 
inside the door. That still leaves but this space 
between the floor and the cage to be accounted 
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for. Whether she was occupying part of that space 
or not is a question. 
Now referring to what Mr. Murphy, I believe 
the gentleman was, said; he testified when he first 
noticed her she was down on her knees, and he 
thought her feet had caught. I t is easy to see how 
he might get that impression, and yet it is purely 
an impression, or you might say, I think it is a 
psychological illusion; I don't think anyone in 
fact believes that her feet were caught, but seeing 
here on her knees, he thought that was what hap-
pened. I don't think it did happen 
We can consider her heels might have been right 
at the edge of that ledge; of course the protruding 
part of the body behind might have been outside, 
the hips, and shoulders, perhaps, but we have 
reached this stage, at least I think the proof 
shows that it did not occur, her trouble did not 
occur, the accident did not occur, while she was 
in the act of entering the act of 
entering perhaps may possibly be construed in 
that way, but what happened, I think to begin 
over, seems to have been this : the door had been 
closed, or partially closed, but so far as any evi-
dence shows, not locked. Attention was' called to 
the fact, or some one said, part of the party were 
not aboard, yet, so the operator opened the door 
again, and Mrs. Snyder and Mrs. Gardner, the 
plaintiff, stepped in, Mrs. Gardner, coming last, 
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then the door was closed and locked and the ele-
vator started. 
Let ' s assume there is a four inch space there, 
according to the undisputed testimony, for clear-
ance ; evidently that seemed considerable, but evi-
dently those who construct elevators know what 
they are doing, and they allow that much, to make 
sure that it would be that much clearance between 
the stationary objects, including the frame in 
which the elevator moves, whatever it may be 
termed, I am not trying to speak accurately, and 
the floor of the cage. Now it is conceivable that 
a person in her situation may have been partially 
within the four inch space, and the parts of the 
T56dy hit, most likely would have been either at |Eei 
hips or shoulders, or one or the other. Thei'e is no 
evidence that she was struck on the hips and there 
is no injury to the hips, no reference was made to 
that, but reference was made to the injury to the 
knee, so that the par t struck w*as the part between 
the shoulder blades where it was bruised, and that 
was so pronounced there is no mistake about it 
that she w a^s struck by something there. After 
she got in the situation, whatever it was, that she 
got when the car started, she hadn't turned 
around, whether she intended to there is no evi-
dence to show—she could testify herself whether 
she intended to turn around, but the allegation of 
the complaint is that the car started suddenly up-
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ward. There is no evidence however, that the 
movement was anything unusual in that regard, 
when a car starts upward, it has started, it begins 
to go and keeps on going until some other point 
of stoppage is reached. I t is conceivable this is 
merely speculation. She might have become slight-
ly dizzy and fell backward or to one side, but to 
my mind the case took a very different aspect 
when the testimony showed there was a car closed 
and locked and ivouldn 't move until it was locked, 
that ivould negative all the testimony looking in 
the direction of starting the car when she had 
partly stepped in, or anything of the kind. I can-
not see there is any evience of negligence. This 
is the only act alleged, and I think, in face of the 
evidence, I think the evidence disproves that. 
It is all speculation, just what did' happen, roe 
don't know what happened, and it must be proven. 
We can't speculate, we have to have some tangi-
ble evidence, it may be slight, but there must be 
some. I think the court must direct a verdict for 
the defendant, because there is lack of evidence of 
negligence, and that ivill be the ruling." 
It is from the above ruling of the trial court in 
directing a verdict for the defendant that the plaintiff 
presents this appeal. The reasoning of the trial court in 
making that ruling is given at leng*th because it contains 
such an excellent and impartial summary and criticism 
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of the evidence. The trial judge, saw and heard the 
witnesses testify, and it is elementary that his ruling 
should not be changed without cogent reasons. Let us 
examine therefore into the testimony and authorities 
to ascertain whether or not the trial judge was correct 
in making the ruling which he did. 
The claim of the plaintiff was (Tr. page 1) that while 
she was in the act of entering the elevator in question 
and before she had an opportunity to get into a safe 
position therein, the defendant carelessly and negligently 
started said elevator suddenly upward. 
This is the only allegation of negligence and of 
course it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to make proof 
of such negligence. The allegations in) her complaint 
are mere conclusions of her own mind and have no prob-
ative force. 
We turn next to the record in search of proof that 
the defendant started the elevator suddenly upward while 
plaintiff was in the act of entering, but our search is 
vain. 
The witness Cyphus testified that, (Trans. 43) with 
some others, he got into the elevator and the " operator 
closed the door and started up." When someone men-
tioned the fact that some of the party were left outside, 
the operator stopped, came down and opened the door 
for them to come in. And Mrs. Snyder and Mrs. Gard-
ner (the plaintiff) came in. "As Mrs. Gardner came in, 
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immediately after she stepped in, the operator started 
the elevator.'' This in itself so far as the testimony of 
Cyphus is concerned, shows that Mrs. Gardner was in the 
elevator and not in the act of entering. He later says 
(Trans. 45) when asked whether he saw the operator 
close the elevator door that to the best of his recollection 
the door was "just in the act of being closed." Every-
thing with him, as with Mrs. Gardner, was "just in the 
act of being done." But the undisputed testimony set 
forth hereinafter conclusively shows that the elevator 
door was closed and locked, and had to be so before the 
car would move and that the plaintiff, who as well as 
her witnesses, was making a desperate effort to re-
member the allegations of her complaint, to the effect 
that she was "in the act" of doing this or that, was 
inside. 
Cyphus on cross examination testified (Trans. 55) 
that the plaintiff was his mother's sister; that nothing 
extended into the elevator cage; (Trans. 57) that the 
cage was absolutely free from any injection from outside. 
He testified further that to the best of his recollection 
the door was partially open (Trans. 59) at the time the 
elevator started. It will be noticed hereafter that Mrs. 
Gardner also testified that the door was not closed at 
the time the elevator started. This was the basis of their 
case of negligence which later being disproved by the 
undisputed fact that the elevator could not move with 
the door opened brought ruin to the plaintiff. 
Frank Murphy, a witness for plaintiff testified that 
"Immediately after that (i. e., descending and receiving 
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«•'. 1 couldn't say whether 1 hoard a voice, 01 exactly 
what attracted my attention to the front nt' the car, 
but just as I faced around I saw \\v>. (jarduer falling 
towards the floor, that is, v ith h»-r kneos toward the floor 
of the car and 1 haw rathoi a rorollertnm that her,— 
slu* made an impression that snmoono, or so mo thing had 
held her feel, her fool had i^ «i <':i\iir lit -" * 
Now there ts ;IM n a i oMnumnon .v.; is there any 
proof that her foot wi-r, in fact caught. This witness 
saw nothing;, IK* siiuplx got, as the court said,, 44an er-
roneous psychological impression." Ho did not see what 
struck her. (Trans. 69) In response to a number of 
loading and suggestive questions l>\ plaintiff's counsel 
he stressed again the fact thai !n> ;.ioa Impression was 
that Mrs. Uardner's feet had been eaughi. (Trans. 69-70) 
Thi<% oi oour>o, i> no ovidonco of nogSior-nro on the part 
of tin? defondai.il. 
This same witness on cross-examination was asked; 
' 'Her 1V«M were not on-jtrhi in i]u* .-nr wore ihov?M 
"* ' *
 :
'
ldnk U*A 
\ «»u ds.»l i-i«. lo-::: hor eonmlnin of her feet, 
hoimr Isn- \ » d ; *>n ' *' 
; ' * -a d-i:"1 *.^ " •- - •- i -o' >• Kh->sJ^diro, aside 
. ;:^:: *A liiii p^opi* i**lij \nn, -^  if*M i*-- 4n- foil down, or 
whether stunt-thing struck her, or what sii i- k her, You 
didn' t see ai rything strike her did y o u ? " , .. 
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A. "No, I did not." r . 
Mr. McKinney, counsel for plaintiff, here made a 
desparate effort to make a show of negligence on the 
ground that the elevator was crowded. The court's at-
tention is respectfully called to Mr. McKinney's'Be-di-
rect examination of Witness Murphy. (Trans. 76) 
Q. "Counsel asked you if there was room in the 
elevator for Mrs. Gardner to get in; you mean by that 
there was room there if she had been given time to get 
in, do you?" An objection was interposed but before 
ruling was made counsel interposed a new question. 
Q. *' You stated there was room in the car for Mrs. 
Gardner to get in. Please explain to the jury." 
Now the answer of the witness required no explana-
tion. But struggling between his conscience and the evi-
dent intention of the question, he answered: ' ' That's my 
recollection, there was room for her to have got into 
the elevator." Another answer which required no ex-
planation, but counsel was not satisfied and asked again, 
"You mean by that there was room enough in the ele-
vator to accomodate more persons—is that what you 
mean?" 
A. " I mean, my judgment of the thing, there would 
be room in an elevator of that size, and also that there 
seemed to me at that time to be room to accomodate all 
the people who were in the car." This, it will be remem-
bered, was the plaintiff's own witness and on direct ex-
amination, but counsel will have it his way and asks: 
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" I t was pretty badly crowded, wasn't i t ! The elevator 
wasn't very big, the elevator cages?" The court SUB 
tained an objection to the question, and in response to 
another querry of the same type the witness answered 
that there was sufficient room in the elevator, (Trans. 
»';? Thn> i-ndi'l *hi- a;!>-<:;i-: in establish negligence. 
Counsel for plaintiff wa> not sworn to testify and except 
for his testimony there was no evidence in this regard, 
Mrs. Frank Murphy testified (Trans. 80) that she 
entered the elevator, walked toward the back and as she 
turned around she saw Mrs. Gardner falling. .The re-
mainder of her testimony relates to the bruise or wound 
on Mrs. Gardner's back, •' ' -^' 
I iOretta Snyder testified (Trans.! •- : i„u HU- rnn-ied 
the elevator and that Mrs, Gardner IVii a#n;n>t IHT back, 
that she did not s<»e Mrs, l . , - . ^ u - « dl nur &^ e what 
struck her, 
;: Emily Gardner (plaintiff) testified ^Tia;- . ; i . : j ihat 
it was either the center or the east elevator upon whu-h 
she rode. That she did use the same elevator several 
times that evening prior to \\n- ;\ri*\*u-.:> ?'?,-^ •*;) 
T h a i s h e SUppu^ ' t i *};. \.;M\ b o t h tVH oi th,- Hi'Vai*>[ hr-
l"on- \\ ^ a . l o d ; ;.Tran~>. 118) that tin* d-»»»r i ' hv i ' l ^va iu r 
^ • : - -»pt»n w\\f\\ V* s t a l l s 1 *1V* ^Tr:i!- '•'*-" 
T h m i^Htj^rti n»-;. considerable medical testimony, 
parii'-f.d:n •;- of • ***•?.;\. chiropractors who nMifu'd con-
'•cr!, )u ni.i^rics tii ])laintiff. They testified that a certain 
X-liay pi*.'i -» JT;. I -h -iw.wi-d a subluxation • • • '•*• of the 
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vertebrae of the spine, because certain oblique lines ap-
peared on either side of the axis. Dr. J. J. Galligan, 
however, testified (Trans. 194) that those lines simply 
indicated that the patient's head was tilted at the time 
the photograph was taken. 
A. " It would indicate that her head was tilted just 
a little bit—as a matter of fact her head was not straight 
when this picture was taken.'' 
It is readily seen from the testimony of the plain-
tiff and her witnesses that there is absolutely no evidence 
that the elevator was started upward with any unusual 
or negligent suddenness and from the testimony of the 
plaintiff herself she was in the elevator. Reliance is ap-
parently made in the testimony above upon the contended 
fact that the elevator was started before the door had 
been closed. That such could not possibly have been the 
case was demonstrated beyond any doubt by the testi-
mony of Claude J. Hooper, who testified (Trans. 196) 
that he was an engineer, that he had an intimate ac-
quaintance with the elevators at the Newhouse Hotel. 
Q. "Can you tell me whether or not it is possible 
for those elevators to operate when the doors are open?" 
A. "Absolutely impossible to run a car with the 
doors open." 
Q. '* Tell the jury why and what the mechanism is.fr 
A. "There is a safety switch on each door. The 
electric line goes to the controller; the other side of the 
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line goes through these door switches, and if a door is 
open the circuit is open and the elevator cannot get the 
current to pass through that open circuit.'9 
Q. " You mean by the switch being open that there 
is no current or power?" 
A. "No power in the controller of the car." 
He further testified (Trans. 199) that to close the 
door it was necessary for the girl operating the elevator 
to put her arm along the opening of the cage. 
Mary Gerber, the operator of the elevator on the 
night of the accident was then called as a witness for 
the defendant. She testified (Trans. 201) that on the 
evening of November 18, 1925, she was operating the 
east elevator; (Trans. 202) that a group of about 
eight people got into her elevator and she took 
them up to the mezzanine floor and down again. 
That subsequently they came to her elevator again 
to be carried to the mezzanine floor. (Trans. 203) 
"On returning to the elevator there was six in 
the crowd came to the elevator, all facing the door, 
and I closed the door and went to start up, when they 
said there was some more coming, and I opened the door 
and waited, and no one came, so I looked out to see if 
someone was coming, and there they were coming and 
taking their time, so I waited for them to enter the ele-
vator. When they entered the elevator everyone faced 
the door except Mrs. Gardner. She stood even with me 
in the elevator, her feet right flat on the floor. I went to 
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shut the door but it didn 't lock. I reopened it and locked 
the door, so I turned the elevator on, and as I turned 
round to tell her to face the door I noticed her stumble 
to the floor, and grabbed hold of her arm." She testi-
fied further that she walked behind Mrs. Gardner to 
shut the door; (Trans. 204) that her elevator was of 
only moderate speed; (Trans. 206) that it takes a short 
time after the power is turned on and the door locked 
for the elevator to start; that everyone was standing 
firm in the elevator when it started, (Trans. 207) even 
to Mrs. Gardner; that she had to pass her arm behind 
the plaintiff to close the door to the cage. (Trans. 208) 
It is indeed amusing after reviewing this evidence 
to turn to plaintiff's brief. In the last paragraph on page 
twelve, totally forgetting the evidence and drawing con-
clusions from their own minds counsel say: 
" Visualizing the scene as portrayed by the evi-
dence, the plaintiff is observed entering the ele-
vator, immediately preceded by Mrs. Snyder, who 
has not yet had opportunity to turn around, while 
others are only in the act of turning. Plaintiff's 
feet appear to be at the edge of, or projecting 
into, the four inch space between the edge of the 
cage and the door, while part of her back pro-
trudes beyond the edge of the car. The operator 
is hurried. Knowing that plaintiff's back is to 
the door, she starts the cage before telling plain-
tiff, or giving her time, to get safely into the 
car and face the front, The ascending ear swiftly 
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carried plaintiff violently against object above 
and she is hurled to the floor of the elevator with 
her head to the north." 
Now there is no evidence quoted in their brief nor 
in the record that Mrs. Snyder had not had time to turn 
around. And one cannot believe that they make the 
statement that the evidence shows Mrs. Gardner's feet 
to have been projecting over the edge in good faith. The 
testimony of Mrs. Gardner and Mr. and Mrs. Murphy 
is that her feet were inside. The testimony of the oper-
ator is that they were "right flat on the floor." There 
is no testimony that the operator was hurried, unless 
Mr. McKinney's testimony be counted, and although 
he testified considerably it was not under oath. 
There is not one bit of testimony even tending in 
any way to show that the operator was incompetent. 
It is elementary that the plaintiff must establish that 
the injury was occasioned by the negligence of the de-
fendant, and of course negligence is never presumed, but 
must be established by competent proof. This is a fund-
amental principle of the law of evidence and is supported 
by reason and authority; 1 Greenl. Evidence, Section 
8P and cases cited; 2 Redfield on Railways (6th Edi-
tion) page 268; 1 Sherman and R. on Negligence 
(4th Edition, Sec. 55); 4 Elliot on Railways, sec-
tions 1583-1587; Wharton on Negligence, Section 421; 1 
Borer on Railroads, page 697, paragraph 7, where the 
author says: " It is a well settled principle of the com-
mon law, that to recover for injuries or loss occasioned 
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by negligence, the negligence must be alleged by the 
plaintiff in his pleadings, and must by him be proven, 
negligence is never presumed.'' This court in Major vs. 
0. S. L. R. R. Co., 21 Utah 145 approved an instruction 
to the effect that "negligence is never presumed/' Of 
course this is not a case in which the doctrines of res ipsa 
loquitur would apply. It is not contended that there was 
a breaking of machinery or anything of that nature. 
The most that can be said for the plaintiff is that 
she proved that she had suffered an injury, but mere 
proof of injury is no proof of negligence. Major v. 0. 
S. L. R. R. Co., at 21 Utah 145 "and the mere proof that 
an injury was received on the train or vehicle is not 
sufficient to raise the presumption of negligence, it must 
further be shown that there was some defect in appliance 
or the manner of their use.M 
In Harry Wells vs. Utah Construction Co., 27 Utah 
524, the court held that refusal to instruct that "The 
mere fact the accident happened is not sufficient proof 
to charge the defendant with negligence" was ground 
for reversal. In Brymer vs. Southern Pacific Co., 90 
Cal. 296; 27 p. 371 the defendant requested the court to 
instruct that "the mere fact that an accident occurred 
by which plaintiff was injured does not fix the liability, 
or even raise a .presumption that the defendant was at 
fault in providing machinery or appliances for the labor 
in whicli the plaintiff was engaged." The defendant 
moved for a new trial, which was granted on the ground 
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that the court erred in refusing to give the instruction 
requested. 
The case of Marker vs. Mitchell, Ohio, 1893, 54 Fed. 
637 is much relied upon by the appellant. The case is 
not only old but contains no statement of facts from 
which we are able to ascertain how the injury was caused, 
i. e., whether through breaking of machinery, clothes be-
ing caught or otherwise. The writer cannot find in the 
case any such ruling as is set out at the bottom of page 
14 of appellant's brief. And moreover, if appellant cites 
the case as an authority for the degree of care required 
of one who operates an elevator it is distinctly against 
her, the court saying at page 638 that the language used 
by the trial court to the effect that the "highest degree 
of care consistent with the possibility of injury", was 
required, was not fortunate, that only a proportionate 
reasonable degree of care under the circumstances was 
required. The case evidently went off on the question 
as to whether or not a skillful employee had been ob-
tained, and the question of excessive damages. 
Of course if the plaintiff wishes to prove that the 
operator of an elevator is an insurer of the safety of 
his passengers, all the cases cited in her brief are against 
her. The case of Goodsell vs. Taylor, 1 Minn, 207; 42 
N. W. 873—simply applies the rule of reasonable care. 
In Hensler vs. Stex, 113 Mo. app., 162; 88 S. W. 108, 
the elevator was started when the operator knew or 
should have known that plaintiff's dress was caught in 
the door. Clearly that case has no application here. As 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
to the standard of care required, the court clearly holds 
that the care required is that of a prudent, practical man 
under the circumstances. The rest of the cases cited 
by counsel concern themselves with care in selection of 
operatives and construction of the elevator to prevent 
breaking of machinery, etc. With those problems we are 
not concerned. There is neither complaint nor proof 
that the defendant either employed a careless servant or 
had an elevator which was not properly constructed. The 
trial court clearly analyzed the case when he said that 
the only act of negligence alleged was that the elevator 
was started suddenly upward while the plaintiff was in 
the act of entering. The record shows that she had 
completed the act of entering and the door of the cage 
had been closed and locked, and that to close and lock 
the door the arm of the operator had gone behind Mrs. 
Gardner who was certainly, therefore, inside the cage 
and not in the act of entering. 
The burden is upon the appellant to show reversable 
error in the record and in this respect the evidence must 
be considered in the view most favorable to the con-
clusions of the court, Shean vs. Cook, 179 p. 185 (Cal), 
where the court said: "The main question presented 
by the appeal is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the finding of the court that Mrs. Cook was 
not a stockholder in the corporation. In determining 
that question we must consider the evidence from the 
view most favorable to the conclusion of the court." 
Eitz vs. Carpenter, 178 N. W. 877. 
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In other words all reasonable presumptions are made 
in favor of the trial court. 
It is the duty of one insisting on error to make the 
same affirmatively appear. Cortner vs. Hill 110 So. 322 
(Ala). 
The burden is upon appellants to show error. Con-
sumers Ice & Coal Co. vs. Security Bank. 280 S. W. 677 
(Ark). 
In Goodale vs. Thorn, 249 Pac. 11 (Cal), it is held 
that to justify reversal error must bej clearly shown. 
If the law were otherwise there would be no finality or 
stability to any decision. A contrary doctrine would 
require the absurd conclusion that decisions are pre-
sumed to be erroneous. The decisions are uniform that 
the appellant must overcome the presumption in favor 
of the decision and show error affirmatively. Daly vs. 
Irwin, 243 p. 443 (Cal). Furlong vs. Alexander, 243 P. 
887 (Cal). Jacquith vs. Justices et etc., 247 p 224 (Cal). 
Robinson vs. Godfrey, 248 p. 268 (Cal). 
In Davitt v. Long Bell Farm Land Corp. 110 So. 88 
(La) it is held that appellant's burden of showing error 
is not discharged by showing mere conflict in evidence. 
In State vs. American Bank and Trust Co., 243 p. 
1093 (Mont.) it is held that appellants have burden to 
show that conclusion of trial court cannot be sustained 
on any admissible theory. Gravelin vs. Porter, 250 p. 
• 823 (Mont). 
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Simpson v. Tobacco Growers Assn., 130 S. E. 507 
(N. C ) , appellant must make error appear plainly as 
presumption is against him. 
State v. Mouvies Land Assn., 207 N. W. 492 (N. D.). 
Curtain vs. Moroney, 246 Pac. 232 (Okla). Quinn v. 
Drummond, 132 Atl. 439 (R. I ) . Ives vs. Rutland, 133 
S. E. 539 (S. C.) U. S. F. & Q. vs. Rochester, 281, S. W. 
306 affirmed 283 S. W. 135 (Texas). Wisconsin Face 
& Fire Brick Co. vs. Bonnett Const. Co., 206 N". W. 204 
(Wis.). 
It is our contention that no error is shown in the 
record here and that the holding below should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HENRY D. MOYLE, 
J. M. CHRISTENSEN. 
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